The 2026 QSR Real Estate Bidding War: Too Many Chains Chasing Too Few A-Sites

There are only so many corners left.

That's the uncomfortable truth sitting underneath every ambitious expansion announcement in the quick-service restaurant industry right now. McDonald's wants 900 new US stores by 2027. Dutch Bros is opening at least 181 new shops this year. Raising Cane's is gunning for 100 new locations in 2026 alone. CAVA has guided 74 to 76 net new openings for the year. Wingstop has a stated target of 10,000 global units, up from just over 3,000 today.

All of them, with rare exceptions, want the same thing: a pad site on a high-traffic suburban corner, ideally with an existing curb cut, room for at least one drive-thru lane, and enough square footage for an operational kitchen. The problem is that the supply of those sites has not grown to match the demand. The result is a bidding war that is reshaping franchisee economics, accelerating new construction formats, and forcing operators to reconsider what a viable site even looks like.

The Collision Course

The math is straightforward and brutal. The National Restaurant Association's 2026 State of the Industry report projects a $1.55 trillion US restaurant industry, but real growth of only 1.3%. The expansion pipeline is concentrated because several major chains are all executing growth phases simultaneously, not staggered.

McDonald's is the most consequential player. The company has publicly committed to reaching 50,000 global restaurants by 2027, with roughly 900 of those new locations coming in the US. McDonald's already operates around 14,000 domestic units, so 900 more represents a meaningful footprint push, concentrated in suburban and exurban markets where drive-thru economics are strongest. The company's "4Ds" growth framework, which covers digital, delivery, drive-thru, and development, puts drive-thru-capable real estate at the center of every site decision.

Raising Cane's opened its 1,000th restaurant in early 2026, a flagship unit on Hollywood Boulevard, and immediately signaled that the milestone was a launchpad, not a finish line. The chain plans to open nearly 100 new US locations this year, with a long-term target of 1,600 domestic restaurants. International expansion, including a London flagship in 2026, adds additional momentum. For a chain with a single-focused menu that generates some of the highest average unit volumes in the chicken segment, the incentive to take real estate risk is high.

Dutch Bros, the Oregon-born drive-thru coffee chain, is building at a pace that would have seemed implausible five years ago. After growing revenue nearly 30% in 2025, the company committed to opening at least 181 new shops in 2026, building toward a goal of 2,029 locations by 2029. At roughly 900 square feet per unit, a Dutch Bros requires a smaller physical footprint than most burger or chicken concepts, but it still needs a pad site with strong drive-thru stacking capacity and high-visibility access. In suburban trade areas, Dutch Bros competes directly with every other QSR brand for the same corner parcels.

CAVA, the Mediterranean fast-casual chain, has guided 74 to 76 net new restaurants for full-year 2026. That figure represents roughly 17% portfolio growth in a single year, an aggressive clip for a company that only recently passed 350 locations. CAVA's real estate requirements skew toward end-cap and inline positions in grocery-anchored shopping centers, which puts it in a slightly different competitive lane from pure drive-thru brands. But as the chain pushes into smaller markets and suburban infill locations, the site overlap with other fast-casual operators intensifies.

Wingstop, with 3,056 locations at the end of 2025, targets 15% to 16% global unit growth in 2026, adding roughly 460 to 490 net new units. The company's long-term vision of 10,000 global restaurants requires relentless domestic infill and penetration into secondary and tertiary markets. Wingstop's off-premise model gives it some real estate flexibility, as the brand does not require a dining room, which allows it to fit in smaller inline spaces. But growth-phase expansion still requires securing site agreements at scale, and in competitive suburban DMAs, even inline availability is constrained.

What Site Scarcity Actually Costs

When multiple national chains pursue the same trade area simultaneously, landlords and site sellers gain negotiating leverage they rarely hold in normal market conditions. Ground lease rents for premium QSR sites have climbed accordingly.

The Chick-fil-A market illustrates the ceiling. A newly constructed Chick-fil-A ground lease in Placentia, California recently sold for $7.9 million, setting a record for Orange County QSR transactions. Chick-fil-A's corporate-guaranteed, 15-year absolute triple-net leases typically include 10% rent escalations every five years. The brand's reputation for generating exceptional per-unit revenue, combined with corporate credit quality, makes it among the most sought-after tenants in net lease real estate. Chick-fil-A net lease transactions consistently trade at some of the lowest cap rates in the QSR sector, reflecting the premium investors assign to corporate-guaranteed revenue. When Chick-fil-A is willing to pay top dollar for a corner, it signals to every other tenant that the market is competitive and sets a pricing benchmark that lifts costs across the board.

New construction costs compound the site acquisition pressure. FDD filings and franchise broker estimates put total QSR build-out costs at roughly $1.5 million to $2.5 million for a typical new-construction free-standing unit, depending on market, format, and configuration. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Producer Price Index for nonresidential construction inputs rose more than 35% between 2020 and 2025, and construction labor shortages and lengthier permitting timelines in many municipalities have added further cost pressure.

For a franchisee evaluating a new site in 2026, the math is different from what their FDD showed three years ago. A $2 million construction investment, financed at current rates, against a ground lease that costs more than it did in 2022, produces a payback period that can stretch well beyond the 36-month threshold that many franchise development teams cite as a target for unit economics viability.

The Second-Gen Opportunity and Its Limits

One release valve is the wave of closures coming from struggling legacy chains. Pizza Hut has announced 250 location closures in the first half of 2026 as part of its Hut Forward turnaround plan. Papa Johns is closing 200 locations in 2026 and another 100 in 2027. Wendy's is in the middle of one of the largest retrenchments in its history, closing roughly 300 to 358 US restaurants in the first half of 2026 alone.

In aggregate, those three brands will vacate close to 900 locations over the course of 2026 and 2027. Many of those sites are in exactly the kinds of suburban trade areas that growth chains want, with existing curb cuts, drive-thru infrastructure already in place, and established traffic patterns. Acquiring a second-generation QSR site can cost significantly less than new construction, because the shell, hood systems, drive-thru lane, and often some equipment already exist. The site has a track record, even if the prior tenant's concept failed.

The problem is that 900 vacating sites do not go uncontested. When a Wendy's or Pizza Hut closes, it generates real broker activity immediately. Leasing agents know the site's configuration, traffic count, and trade area data. Growth brands with active development pipelines are often already tracking those locations before the closure is public. The competition for good second-gen sites can be as fierce as for new pads.

Bank branch conversions represent another conversion opportunity that has gained traction. Thousands of US bank branches have closed over the past decade as digital banking has reduced the need for physical footprints. Former bank buildings often share key characteristics with QSR pads: corner locations, existing drive-thru lanes, 1,500 to 3,000 square feet of building space, and high-traffic arterial frontage. Starbucks, Dutch Bros, and Chipotle have all converted former bank branches into new units. As bank branch closures continue, adaptive reuse into QSR will remain an important supply source.

Smaller Footprints as a Strategic Response

The industry's response to site scarcity and construction inflation has been a systematic rethinking of what a QSR building actually needs to be.

Krystal's new drive-thru and carryout-only prototype comes in at 1,200 square feet, compared to the brand's standard 2,700-square-foot restaurant. The smaller format uses 20% less kitchen space while maintaining throughput. Dutch Bros' 900-square-foot shop model has become a proof point that high-volume drive-thru operations do not require large buildings. McDonald's has been developing smaller-format units and drive-thru-only concepts as part of its CosMc's and McValue expansion thinking. The common thread: if the building is smaller, it fits on more sites, costs less to build, and can pencil on land that a full-size prototype could not justify.

The economics are compelling. A smaller building reduces construction cost per unit substantially. That improvement in build cost partially offsets the higher land and lease costs in competitive markets. It also shortens the payback period, which is the key metric franchisees and their lenders care about most when approving new development.

The trade-off is operational capacity. A smaller kitchen limits the menu and throughput ceiling. For brands with highly focused menus, like Raising Cane's or Dutch Bros, that trade-off is minimal. For full-menu QSR chains, it forces harder choices about which items to carry in a smaller-format unit.

Ground Lease vs. Owned: The Economics Under Pressure

The lease-versus-own question has always been central to QSR real estate strategy, but elevated site costs have sharpened the analysis.

Most QSR operators, particularly franchisees, do not own the land under their restaurants. They operate on ground leases, typically 15 to 20 years in length with renewal options, paying rent to a property owner who holds the underlying real estate. The franchisee owns the building and the business; the landlord owns the dirt. This structure keeps capital requirements lower for franchisees but means their occupancy cost is variable, subject to market rents at renewal.

In the current environment, new ground leases for premium QSR sites are being signed at rent levels that were rare five years ago. In major metros, monthly ground rent for a new-construction QSR pad has climbed sharply, in addition to the franchisee's own construction costs. Over a 15-year lease term with escalation clauses, that commitment is substantial.

Franchisees who own their land, or who can acquire sites in advance of development through option agreements, have a meaningful structural advantage in the current market. The sale-leaseback model, where an operator builds a restaurant, sells the real estate to an investor at completion, and leases it back on a long-term NNN basis, has been popular in low-rate environments as a way to recycle capital. In the current rate environment, the arithmetic is less favorable, but operators with strong credit and high-volume units can still execute advantageous deals.

Dutch Bros' shift toward build-to-suit development, where a property owner finances and constructs the building to Dutch Bros' specifications and then leases it back, helped reduce the chain's capital expenditure per shop from $1.8 million in Q4 2024 to $1.3 million in Q4 2025. That $500,000 reduction in capital deployment per site has meaningful implications for growth velocity when multiplied across 181 planned 2026 openings.

What Operators Should Be Watching

The real estate competition playing out in 2026 is not a short-term phenomenon. The brands with the most aggressive expansion targets, including McDonald's, Dutch Bros, Raising Cane's, and CAVA, are all executing multi-year growth programs that will keep demand elevated through at least 2027 and likely beyond.

For franchisees evaluating new development agreements, the relevant questions have shifted. Site quality matters more than it did when prime locations were easier to secure. A B-site that penciled in 2021 may not pencil at 2026 costs. The payback period calculation needs to incorporate realistic land and lease costs for the specific market, not system averages from a prior era.

The second-gen site wave from Pizza Hut, Papa Johns, and Wendy's closures creates real opportunity, but operators should approach those sites with the same rigor as new construction. A second-gen site in a trade area that saw a QSR fail is not automatically attractive. The prior operator's failure had a cause: traffic counts, competition, demographics, or site configuration. Understanding why the prior tenant left matters.

Conversion opportunities, whether from bank branches, casual dining closures, or other retail formats, require careful assessment of existing infrastructure. Drive-thru lanes designed for banking, where the physical interaction is brief and predictable, are often not optimized for food service throughput. Building out a former bank into a QSR involves its own cost structure.

The broader message for any operator in expansion mode is that the cost of real estate mistakes has risen along with the cost of real estate itself. Site selection was always important. In 2026, it may be the single most consequential decision in franchisee development economics.

QSR Pro Staff covers operations, finance, and strategy for the quick-service restaurant industry.